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1.    Abstract
1 
 
This paper analyzes how imperfections of property rights affect allocation of assets and 
welfare, using micro-survey data from Bulgaria. Co-ownership of assets is widespread in 
many  countries  due  to  inheritance.    Central  and  Eastern Europe offers  an  interesting 
natural experiment to assess the effects of such rights imperfections because of the asset 
restitution  process  in  the  1990s.    Bulgaria  is  particularly  interesting  because  of  the 
prominence of the co-ownership problem (about half of all land plots are co-owned), 
because of  the  strong  fragmentation of  land,  and because  of legislation  providing  an 
instrument to separate out chosen (endogenous) versus forced (exogenous) forms of co-
ownership.  We find that land in co-ownership is much more likely to be used by less 




2.  Introduction 
The recent empirical growth literature emphasizes property rights as the prime example 
of how institutions can affect growth (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu 
and Johnson, 2005). The micro-literature on property rights has attempted to disentangle some of 
the underlying mechanisms by focusing on the impact of property rights on credit and investment 
(e.g. Besley, 1995; Field, 2005; Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2005) and on land allocation (e.g. 
Lanjouw and Levy, 2002). While some argue that secure and complete private property rights are 
important for economic development and poverty reduction (e.g. De Soto, 2000; Olson, 2000), 
others have pointed out that substantial growth has often occurred without perfect rights (Rozelle 
and Swinnen, 2004). In China, rapid growth took off after a fundamental reform transferred land 
property rights from collective to private ownership under the rural household responsibility 
system (Lin, 1992).  However, the resulting land rights, which stimulated this dramatic growth 
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those of the authors and not necessarily reflect those of organizations they are associated with or those that funded 
the research   3 
and poverty reduction, were far from complete and not perfectly secure (Jacobi et al, 2002; Qian, 
2003).   
In contrast to China, land privatization in Eastern Europe and much of the Former Soviet 
Union  focused  on  establishing  full  ownership  rights  (Macours  and  Swinnen,  2002).  More 
generally,  reforms  in  these  transition  countries  include  some  of  the  most  radical  and  swift 
changes  in  property  rights  in  recent  history,  and  caused  fundamental  changes  in  ownership 
structure. As such they provide a unique opportunity to analyze the impact of property rights. 
The conclusions drawn from this experiment also provide a mixed and nuanced picture. Rapid 
privatization did not always lead to an optimal initial allocation of assets, as local elites often 
were quick to take advantage of these reforms (Roland, 2002; Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer, 
2001).  Yet, studies also show that privatization allowed the emergence of new companies that 
generally have outperformed both the transformed and the remaining state-owned companies 
(Bilsen and Konings, 1998; Konings et al., 2005; Nickel, 1996;). 
In  this  paper  we  contribute  to  this  literature  by  analyzing  how,  after  privatization, 
remaining imperfections of property rights have affected allocation of assets and welfare, using 
micro-evidence  from  Bulgaria.  Johnson,  McMillan  and  Woodruff  (2002)  have  analyzed  the 
effects of property rights insecurity on investment using firm-level data from 5 post-communist 
countries, but overall the empirical micro-evidence on property rights in transition countries is 
limited.  Post-privatization imperfections of property rights often arose as assets were restituted 
to pre-collectivization (“former”) owners. Property rights restitution to former owners often led 
to co-ownership of assets by the children or grandchildren of former owners.  This form of co-
ownership is widespread in Central and Eastern Europe (OECD, 1997; Dale and Baldwin, 2000), 
but has received relatively little attention.  
Bulgaria offers an interesting natural experiment to analyze these issues, because of the 
prominence of the co-ownership problem (about half of all land plots are co-owned), the strong 
fragmentation of the land, and because of legislation providing an instrument to separate out 
chosen (endogenous) versus forced (exogenous) forms of co-ownership. Land privatization in 
Bulgaria occurred through restitution of physical plots of land to the families that had owned 
land prior to the post-WWII collectivization processes. Hence, in the beginning of the 1990s,   4 
households, many of whom had long ago moved out of the rural areas, obtained ownership of 
agricultural  land.  This  was  typically  land  that  had  historically  belonged  to  their  parents  or 
grandparents, but had been de facto expropriated during collectivization. All legal heirs were 
entitled by descent to part of the each plot.
2 To avoid land fragmentation, a law imposed a 
minimum plot size of 0.3 hectares. The law resulted in forced co-ownership of land for many 
households.  
The theoretical literature on joint ownership suggests that it might lead to suboptimal 
investment levels (e.g. Hart, 1995) and impede optimal allocation of assets (Holderness, 2003; 
Deaton  2006)  as  transaction  costs  in  decision-making  and  exercising  their  rights  constrain 
owners in making optimal decisions.   Based on these insights, we hypothesize that co-ownership 
makes it more likely that assets are allocated to traditional (and often inefficient) users, or are left 
abandoned, and thus negatively affect efficiency and welfare.   
To identify the effect of co-ownership, we will exploit the non-linearity caused by the 
minimum plot size legislation. In particular, we take advantage of the fact that it implies forced 
co-ownership for plots that would be below the minimum size if they were to be divided among 
all the legal co-owners. The artificial cut-off of 0.3 hectares allows identifying the effect of 
forced  joint  ownership  through  a  regression  discontinuity  analysis.  We  estimate  whether the 
probability of certain types of plot allocations change discontinuously at the cut-off plot size, 
while accounting for the fact that the plot allocation may differ by plot size even if no minimum 
plot  size law  exists. Methodologically,  this  paper hence  relates  to  work  that  uses  regression 
discontinuity design to identify causal relationships (e.g. Pitt and Khankher, 1988; Angrist and 
Levy,  1998;  Van  der  Klaauw,  2002).
3  The  identification  further  relies  on  the  fact  that 
households’ land ownership in Bulgaria was determined through the restitution process in the 
beginning of the 1990s, as land sales markets are still very small. In addition, we use household 
fixed effects in our plot level analysis to control for potential political power and influence that 
                                                 
2  While similar inheritance laws exist in several Western-European countries, co-ownership is less widely observed 
because land gets divided among heirs immediately after inheritance and parcels generally do not stay fragmented 
but are often consolidated through land swaps or rental and sales after the division. Given the absence of any type of 
land market during Central Planning, such adjustments where not possible in Bulgaria and the privatization process 
in the 1990s suddenly “revealed” this massive co-ownership situation. 
3 Buddelmeyer and Skoufias (2004) recently compared regression discontinuity results with the results obtained 
from the randomized evaluation and found an overall good performance of the regression discontinuity estimators.   5 
might have played a role during the restitution process and for other household unobservables. 
The method used in this paper therefore also relates to Goldstein and Udry (2005) who use 
variation across plots from the same household to shed light on property rights insecurity in 
Ghana. 
This paper contributes to the literature on property rights by providing micro-evidence of 
the  possible  negative  effects  of  imperfect  rights.  The  specific  imperfection  analyzed  in  this 
paper, co-ownership of rights, is important beyond transition countries.   Co-ownership of assets 
is common in many developing countries, and even in the US, mainly after inheritance (Mitchell, 
2001; Shoemaker, 2003). By analyzing the effect of legislation that de facto restricts property 
rights, this paper also relates to research indicating that gains from formal property rights might 
be limited in the presence of other market imperfections (Carter and Olinto, 2003;  Boucher et 
al., 2005) or weak enforcement institutions (Conning and Robinson, 2007; Macours et al., 2005). 
Finally,  the  analysis  relates  to  Blarel  et  al.  (1992)  and  Mearns  (1999)  who  analyze  policy 
interventions and legislation targeted at preventing land fragmentation in other settings.   
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  We  first  explain  the  property  rights  reforms  and 
legislation in Bulgaria, describe our data and discuss the identification strategy. We then analyze 
the land allocation choices households face. We estimate a multinomial logit to account for all 
the different choices, and show that land in co-ownership is much more likely to be used by 
large-scale cooperatives or to be left abandoned, while it is less likely to be used by individual 
household farms or de novo agricultural companies. We also estimate a model with household 
fixed effects and show that our results are robust. The effect of co-ownership on land allocation 
is  identified  using  a  regression  discontinuity  design.  Using  a  semi-parametric  estimator  we 
further illustrate the effect of the law on perceptions of property rights. After establishing the 
effects of co-ownership on land allocation, we focus on the efficiency and welfare implications 
of our findings. We find in particular that co-ownership leads to significant welfare losses. 
3.  Background on the land restitution and minimum plotsize legislation in Bulgaria 
From  the  late  1940s  through  the  1980s,  agricultural  production  in  Bulgaria  was 
collectivized. The large majority of all agricultural land was used by collective and state farms,   6 
while private household plots only accounted for 13% of agricultural land (table 1). All this 
changed dramatically in the 1990s. Former communist co-operatives were liquidated and their 
assets  were  transferred  to  a  variety  of  new  farm  organisations,  including  limited  liability 
companies, share holding companies, joint stock companies and new agricultural cooperatives. 
By 2001, the share of arable land used by restructured cooperatives and state farms had fallen to 
51%  of  the  agricultural  land,  while  individual  farms  and  companies  each  cultivated 
approximately one quarter of agricultural land (table 2).
4 
The effective property rights on the land were restituted to the former landowners, based 
on the land records of 1946. Given that a large part of the original owners were no longer alive, 
land was transferred by descent to their heirs. According to the Bulgarian Inheritance Law, every 
heir gets an equal share of the property when the owner dies. If during the land reform process X 
parcels had to be divided among Y owners, each owner received 1/Y share of each of these X 
parcels.
    
At the end of the 1990s, more than 80% of agricultural land titles had been restituted to 
individuals. The land restitution process resulted in a strong fragmentation of land ownership 
(figure 1). In several regions of the country, households owned, on average, more than five plots, 
with an average plot size of only 0.7 hectares. Moreover, after restitution, a large share of the 
parcels was co-owned by more than one owner (table 3). Land “co-ownership” results from a 
combination of factors: (a) the way land was restituted; (b) the current inheritance law; (c) the 
fragmented 1946 ownership structure; (d) the absence of a land market during communism;
 and 
(e) difficulties in identifying and locating all the entitled heirs during the restitution process and 
in reaching an agreement on the division among all of them.   
This  type  of  co-ownership  situations  also  exists  in  many  other  transition  countries. 
However, in Bulgaria, it is further enhanced by legislation that sets a legal minimum size for a 
land parcel. To prevent excessive fragmentation of land, a law was introduced which states that a 
plot cannot get a separate ownership title if it is smaller than 0.3 ha.
5 Vineyards and pastures 
                                                 
4 Less than 2% of the agricultural land is used by state farms. They rely on state owned land for their cultivation 
instead of privately owned land and therefore do not enter our analysis. 
5 This legislation was part of the Law for Agricultural Land Ownership and Use (LALOU) and the Regulation for 
Application of the Law for Agricultural Land Ownership and Use (RALALOU), both introduced in 1991. These   7 
need to have a minimum size of respectively 0.1 ha and 0.2 ha.  Hence, a parcel cannot be 
divided  among heirs  if  the  size of  the newly  created  plots would  fall  below  these levels,  a 
situation which we refer to as “forced” co-ownership.  
The officially stated reason for the minimum plot size legislation is to prevent inefficient 
land use by avoiding excessive land ownership fragmentation. However, the impact may well 
have been opposite, i.e., that it has constrained efficient land use. E.g., before somebody can sell 
the land to somebody else, they have to agree with all owners. Hence, co-ownership is likely to 
increase  the  transaction  costs  in  land  decision-making  and  allocation,  and  therefore  lead  to 
imperfect property rights, which may result in suboptimal land allocation, use and exchange 
(Barzel, 1997).  
This  paper  hypothesizes  in  particular that  these additional  decision-making  costs  will 
make  it  more  likely  that  the  “default  option”  will  prevail.  In  the  context  of  post-restitution 
Bulgaria, the default option is either to leave land with the traditional users of the land, which are 
the former collective farms that are now mostly organized as cooperative farms, or, not using the 
land at all. If co-ownership significantly increases the transaction costs in (re-) allocating land, 
we  should  expect  co-owned  land  plots  to  be  left  more  abandoned  and  to  be  used  more  by 
cooperatives, ceteris paribus. 
Anecdotal  evidence  from  our  field  interviews  suggests  that  this  is  indeed  often  the 
outcome. To illustrate this, we describe two cases that are typical for  the situations that we 
encountered in the field.  The first case is a household that received 32 hectares of land through 
the restitution process, located in two plots of equal size.  The first plot of 16 hectares is co-
owned by three absentee relatives.  The second plot is co-owned by another 25 people, of which 
24 have migrated and are now living in Turkey and only one is living in the same village. The 
first plot is legally rented out to a farming enterprise based on a contract with the 3 co-owners. 
The second one falls into a field cultivated by a co-operative from the neighbouring city and is 
cultivated by the co-operative without any contract or written permission given from any of the 
co-owners. The absence of the co-owners prevents not only the division of the land, but also its 
                                                                                                                                                             
laws have been changed many times since then (in fact more than 30 times for the LALOU), but the rules regarding 
the minimum plot size were not affected by these changes.     8 
withdrawal  from the  co-operative  as  the  management  of the  latter  refuses to  leave the  plot, 
gaining from the unsolved co-ownership issue. In the second case, in another of the surveyed 
villages, two companies wanted to rent two plots of, respectively, 6 hectares and 7 hectares for a 
period of 15 years while simultaneously investing in a processing facility in the village. It took 
the two companies 8 months using the efforts of 3 people - including the mayor of the village - to 
locate all the co-owners. Costs related to locating co-owners (approximately 90), obtaining their 
agreement,  and  registration  of  the  rental  contract  in  the  notary,  the  court  and  the  land 
commission, had to be covered by the companies.  
These examples suggest that co-ownership, whether it is because of legal limits (e.g. case 
2)  or  because  of  other  constraints  (e.g.  case  1)  might  be  a  serious  problem,  with  negative 
implications for efficiency and welfare. A household’s return to its land asset is expected to be 
lower when the land is in co-ownership because the probability of land being allocated to a low-
return default allocation increases a plot cannot be divided among co-owners and/or decision-
making is difficult. The examples also suggest that efficient allocation might be more difficult 
the larger the number of co-owners and the further away they live. In the rest of this paper we 
will econometrically assess and quantify how co-ownership affects the allocation of land and 
households’ welfare.  
4.  Data 
Our  analysis  is  based  on  household  and  plot  level  data  collected  in  2003  in  18 
communities, randomly sampled in three Bulgarian regions. The regions were selected to reflect 
important variations in the rural economy, agricultural structure, and geographical conditions. 
Detailed  household  and  plot  level  information  was  gathered  from  700  households  through 
interviews with key informants and household members. The households were selected using a 
stratified random sampling frame, with stratification based on whether they rented land from 
other household members.
6 
                                                 
6 This stratification was followed because the data was originally collected to shed light on households’ participation 
on both sides of the rental markets. As households decisions to rent land from  others and decisions about the 
allocation of their own land are clearly related, we account for the sampling frame in the empirical analysis (see 
section 5).    9 
Table 3 illustrates the co-ownership issue.  50% of all parcels owned by the sampled 
households  are  in  “co-ownership”.  One-fifth  of  the  parcels  are  owned  by  two  households, 
another 14% have three co-owners and around 16% of the parcels are owned by at least 4 co-
owners (figure 2). More than 40% of the parcels owned by rural households (or 79% of all co-
owned plots) are in forced co-ownership and  cannot be divided among the owners by law.
7  
Interestingly, owners declare to have effective decision power over 67% of non co-owned plots, 
but  only  for  32%  of  the  co-owned  plots.  The  descriptive  statistics  also  show  that  land 
fragmentation is quite strong. Households own an average of 5.8 plots, while average plot size is 
about 0.7 hectares. 
The land sales market in rural Bulgaria is not well developed. Selling of agricultural land 
is very limited. Our survey data show that by 2003 only 3% of rural households own land that 
they  had  bought  since  the  start  of  transition.  Hence,  the  amount  of  land  owned  is  largely 
determined by pre-collectivization land ownership. The main form of land exchange in Bulgaria 
is through the rental market. 78% of all land owning households in our survey rent out land and 
20% of the land cultivating households are renting in land.  Around 40% of the parcels that are 
owned by the surveyed households are rented out to a cooperative and 16% is rented out to a 
farming company (table 3).  At the household level, 50% of all land owning households are 
renting out some land to a cooperative and 29% to a farming company.  Further, 9% of the 
landowning households are renting out land to another household, but only two percent of the 
parcels owned by rural households are exchanged with other households.  18% of the parcels are 
cultivated by the owners.  
Land  abandonment  is  remarkably  widespread.  More  than  40%  of  all  land  owning 
households in our 2003 survey leave some land abandoned, and 23% of the total number of plots 
owned  by  rural  households  are  left  abandoned.  This  high  level  of  land  abandonment  is 
remarkable given that leaving land fallow for soil recovery is not a common practice in Bulgaria. 
                                                 
7 Field interviews revealed that informal arrangements that circumvent the law are rare.    10 
5.  Identification 
This paper uses the legal minimum plot size cut-off level to analyze the effect of property 
rights  imperfections  under  the  form  of  co-ownership  on  the  land  allocation  decision.  In 
particular, we analyze whether the allocation of, and the returns to, land differ depending on 
whether  plots  are  in  co-ownership.  We  expect  co-ownership  to  lead  to  decision-making 
problems, which increases the costs of both using the land and of changing the land allocation. 
Given that these problems are likely to increase with the number of co-owners, we also analyze 
the effects of the number of co-owners.  
The plot size legislation allows addressing the concern that co-ownership of land could 
potentially be endogenous. Certain types of households might chose to keep their land in co-
ownership, while others might chose to split it up, and as such there could be a potential omitted 
variable bias problem.  There is however a large share of all co-owned plots that is in forced co-
ownership, i.e., all the plots that cannot be divided up among the different owners because such 
division would violate the minimum plot size legislation. The identification strategy in this paper 
relies on this exogenous source of co-ownership. 
Bulgaria is a particularly interesting case to study these issues since the characteristics of 
the  land  market  and  regulations  allow  addressing  other  potential  problems  regarding  the 
identification of the property rights effects.  A first concern is the source of ownership, and in 
particular whether ownership comes from restitution or from land purchase/sale.  In Bulgaria, 
land ownership is largely determined through the restitution process and the amount of land 
reflects historical ownership. Indeed, land purchases are very rare in rural Bulgaria.  A World 
Bank survey in 2004 found that only 3.5% of all rural households sold land and only 1% bought 
land since the start of transition.  This is consistent with our survey data (see above). 
It should further be noted that in reality land was regularly not restituted in historical 
boundaries  but  instead  in  comparable  boundaries.   Households with local  political  power  or 
influence often received consolidated parcels of land which were easily accessible from the main 
road or located in the most fertile areas of the territory belonging to the settlement, while people 
without influence on the restitution decision received fragmented parcels with inferior location or 
quality. We will therefore control for plot size and other plot characteristics in the analysis. We   11 
also present a set of results that explicitly controls for all household unobservables, and as such 
explicitly accounts for potential household influence during the restitution process.  
6.  Plot allocation choice and forced co-ownership 
 There are 5 possible allocations for land owned by individual households: 1) owner-
cultivation; 2) renting out to another farming household; 3) renting out to a cooperative, which is 
typically a successor organisation of a former collective farm; 4) renting out to a company; and 
5) abandoning.  For each plot, the household decides among these 5 allocations.  To analyze the 
effect of forced co-ownership on land allocation, we estimate a multinomial logit model and use 
two  alternative measures  of  forced  co-ownership.   The  first specification  includes  a  dummy 
variable that equals one if a plot is in co-ownership and cannot be divided among owners due to 
the legal imposed minimum size, and zero otherwise. Given that the decision-making problems 
are likely to increase with the number of co-owners, the second specification uses the number of 
co-owners in case of forced co-ownership.  
In addition to the variables capturing the imperfection of the property rights on the plot, 
we control for regional fixed effects and a number of household characteristics that are likely to 
affect household’s land allocation. In particular, we include the total amount of land owned by a 
household and two indicators of managerial capacity of the household: age and education of the 
household head. We also include the square terms, as other studies (e.g. Rizov, et al., 2001) 
typically  show  a  non-linear  effect  of  these  human  capital  variables  in  a  transition  context. 
Standard errors are clustered at the household level to account for correlation of choices between 
plots from the same household. In a third specification, we allow for possible correlation at the 
community level, instead of the household level. In specification 4, we include community fixed 
effects, and in specification 5 we add control variables at the plot level. In particular, we include 
a variable measuring land quality, which is based on the Bulgarian land classification system that 
assigns to  each plot a score between 1  and 10, with 1 being the highest quality; a variable   12 
measuring  the  distance  in  kilometres  of  the  plot  to  the  house  of  the  owner,  and  a  variable 
measuring the plotsize itself. All regressions also account for sampling weights.
8 
Table 4 shows the results of the different specifications. The regression coefficients show 
the likelihood of the different allocations, relative to owner-cultivation (the base category in the 
multinomial  regression).  The  results  of  the  first  specification show  that plots  that  cannot  be 
divided by law are much more likely to be either rented out to a cooperative, or to be abandoned. 
Similarly, the results of the second specification show that the higher the number of forced co-
owners, the more likely the plot is to be rented out to a cooperative, or to be abandoned. These 
results are robust to allowing for clustering or fixed effects at the community level, and for the 
inclusion  of  plot-level  control  variables.
9    Hence,  the  results  show  that  plots  in  forced  co-
ownership are much more likely to be left in the default option.  If a plot cannot be divided 
among co-owners because of legal impediments, it becomes more likely that the plot owner is 
either not using the land, i.e. leaving land abandoned, or leaving land with the traditional user of 
the land, which is the former collective, now mostly organized as a cooperative farm. These 
results are consistent with the possible role of high transaction costs and costly decision making 
for plots in forced co-ownership.  
To further explore the importance of transaction costs and coordination costs among co-
owners, we distinguish between co-owners living in the same village, versus co-owners living 
outside of the village. In particular, in a 6
th specification we distinguish between the number of 
forced co-owners living in the village and the number of forced co-owners not living in the 
village. Coordination problems are likely to be larger when co-owners do not live in the same 
village, for example because interaction is more complicated, less frequent and monitoring is 
more  costly.    We  would  expect  therefore  to  find  more  land  to  be  abandoned  or  left  with 
cooperatives the larger the number of co-owners not living in the village.
10   
                                                 
8 We use a weighted multinomial regression because the dependent variable of interest is related to the variable that 
determined sampling weights. The results are however very robust to non-inclusion of the sampling weights.  
9 The results are also robust to exclusion of pastures and vineyards (11% of plots in the sample), which have a lower 
minimum plot size.  
10 This would be true as long as there is no strong informal rules that guide decision making in case of co-ownership, 
such as e.g. a rule that gives the oldest co-owner decision-making power. Such rules seem to exist in other countries 
(e.g. Canada). More generally, the impact of absentee relatives is likely to depend on informal decision-making   13 
Before discussing these results it is useful to note that the results will be more tentative 
than the earlier findings. There could be a potential endogeneity problem if co-ownership has 
induced some of the co-owners to emigrate out of the village, while other households might have 
immigrated  into  the  sampled  communities  because  they  owned  land  which  was  not  in  co-
ownership and which they could easily start cultivating. Nevertheless, our data indicate, that 
endogeneity concerns related to migration might be limited.  Emigration out of the rural areas is 
rare in the sampled villages, as less than 5% of the households that inhabited the rural areas at 
the start of the reforms had emigrated at the time of the survey. Less than 10% of the households 
that are currently living in the villages are immigrants.  Household who immigrated into the 
villages are mainly pensioners and, compared to the non-immigrant households, significantly 
less of those immigrated households are cultivating land.  
The regression results for specification 6 in table 4 suggest that the impact of the number 
of co-owners does depend on whether they are living in or outside the village. The probability of 
renting to a cooperative or leaving the plot abandoned relative to owner-cultivation increases 
with the number of co-owners that are living outside the village, but the number of co-owners 
living inside the village does not significantly affect the probability of the default options. The 
results are consistent with the hypothesis that co-ordination problems are larger when co-owners 
do not live in the same village because interaction is more complicated and less frequent, and 
monitoring by co-owners is more costly. This could imply that imperfections of property rights 
may have little effect on asset allocation if coordination and monitoring costs to address the 
imperfections are low.  
7.  The effect of co-ownership on default plot allocation: partial linear estimator and 
results with household fixed effects  
As discussed in section 4, household characteristics such as entrepreneurship and social 
relations might have affected what type of land a former owner received during the restitution 
process. If these same characteristics affect the post-restitution plot allocation, there is a potential 
omitted  variable  bias.  We  therefore  turn  to  estimations  with  household  fixed-effects.  In 
                                                                                                                                                             
rules. Absentee co-ownership may have the opposite effect if existing informal rules re-enforce the influence of the 
local co-owner, instead of weakening it as in our case.   14 
particular, we estimate the probability of the default option, i.e., of a plot being rented out to a 
cooperative or being abandoned versus all other allocations.
11  The first column of table 5 shows 
the  results  of  a  logit  regression  with  household  fixed  effects  and  controlling  for  plot  level 
characteristics.  To  check  the  robustness  of  the  results,  we  show  the  logit  regression  results 
without household fixed effects in column 2. Similar regression results without controlling for 
plot level characteristics are presented in column 3 and 4.
  12 The estimations with household 
fixed effects confirm our earlier findings. Plots in forced co-ownership are more likely to be 
rented out to cooperatives or left abandoned, even after controlling for household unobservables.  
Both the results of the multinomial logit and the results of the household-fixed effect 
models are robust to inclusion of plot size itself, in addition to the variable measuring forced co-
ownership. This is important given that the forced co-ownership is directly tied to plot size. 
Finding the effect of forced co-ownership after controlling for general plot size effects, suggests 
that  decision  making  on  plots  affected  by  the  minimum-size  law  is  different  than  decision 
making on other plots.  
To further test for changes in the probability of leaving land abandoned or renting it out 
to a cooperative at plot sizes for which legally division among co-owners is not allowed, we now 
use the partially linear estimator developed by  Porter (1999). Let y be the outcome variable 
indicating the probability of leaving the plot abandoned or renting it out to a cooperative, x gives 
the plot size divided by the number of co-owners, and m( ) is continuous in x. The indicator d 
equals 1 if a plot is not in co-ownership or, if co-owned, could legally be divided among co-
owners. d equals 0 if the plot cannot be legally divided. The known discontinuity point of 0.3 
hectare is represented by  x.
13   
 
e a + + = d x m y ) (  where  0 ) , ( = d x E e  and  { } x x d ³ =1  
                                                 
11 We cannot estimate the multinomial logit with household fixed effects for lack of sufficient intra-household 
variation, i.e. there are only few households with all the different possible allocations for different plots. The point 
estimates  of  the  coefficients  of  the  two  default  options  (renting  to  cooperative  and  land  abandonment)  in  the 
multinomial regression are also very similar, further motivating this regrouping. 
12 The estimations only include those households that have at least 2 plots with a different value for the default 
option and that could therefore be included in the household fixed effects logit model. The results of the estimation 
without fixed effects but on the full sample are very similar to the ones presented in column 2 and 4. 
13 Vineyards and pastures are excluded in this estimation, because of the different minimum plot size.    15 
 
By subtracting the conditional expectation with respect to x from both sides, we get  
 
e a + - = - )) ( ( ) ( x d E d x y E y  
 
We use locally weighted regressions to estimate the conditional expectations of y and d 
and calculate y-E(y|x) and d-E(d|x). We then apply least squares to these differences to obtain an 
estimate of a, i.e., the magnitude of the jump in the relationship between land allocation and plot 
size per owner at the cut-off criteria and bootstrap to obtain the standard errors. Figure 3 shows 
that there is a large and significant discontinuity in the relationship at the minimum plot size of 
0.3 ha. Interestingly, we find an even larger and very significant discontinuity if we use the 
perception of property rights as the left hand side variable (figure 4). People with plots in forced 
co-ownership report to have significantly lower decision-making power on those plots.  
So far, we have focused on the issue of forced co-ownership per se. The frequency of this 
type of forced co-ownership also allows us to identify the effect of co-ownership more broadly. 
We can use the exogenous variation in co-ownership that results from the minimum plot size 
legislation as an instrument for co-ownership. Column 2 and 4 in table 6 show results of the IV 
estimation, with the number of forced co-owners being used as the instrument for the actual 
number of owners. For comparison, column 1 and 3 show the reduced-form results of the linear 
probability model. The model is estimated with household fixed effects, both with and without 
additional plot-level control variables. Not surprisingly, the number of forced co-owners is a 
strong instrument for the actual number of co-owners. The second stage results show that the 
number of co-owners has a significant impact on plot allocation. In particular, increasing the 
number of co-owners with 1 increases the probability of the default option with 5 to 6 percentage 
points.
14   
Table 7 shows results by region to show that these results are not driven by the variation 
across regions. We find very similar and significant effects in the North-Central and the South-
Central region. The point estimates for the North-East region are similar but not significant, 
                                                 
14  We tested for non-linearity of this effect but did not find a significant effect.    16 
probably because of an insufficient number of observations. Households in this region own less 
plots  on  average  and  therefore  there  are  relatively  few  observations  with  within-household 
variation  for  that  region.  Overall,  the  results  by  region  confirm  the  earlier  findings  and  the 
magnitude of the coefficients is remarkably similar across regions. This further strengthens our 
results, as other papers (e.g. Besley 1995) have shown that results on property rights are often 
region-specific.  
8.  Effect of co-ownership on welfare 
The results in sections 5 and 6 establish that land in co-ownership is more likely to be 
either left in the cooperative or abandoned. Given that fallowing of land for the purpose of 
restoring  the  productive  potential  of  land  is  not  a  common  practice  in  Bulgaria,  land 
abandonment is likely to be an inefficient allocation of the land.  One could however hypothesize 
that renting out to a cooperative is not necessarily an inefficient default option. While our data do 
not allow calculating efficiency directly, we can look at the existing evidence related to the 
efficiency of different types of farm organizations in Eastern Europe to shed light on this point.  
Gorton and Davidova (2004) reviewed the evidence for a wide set of transition countries. Their 
results  suggest  that  cooperatives  tend  to  be  the  least  efficient  users  of  agricultural  land.
15 
Interpreting our results in light of the findings in the literature hence suggests that co-ownership, 
and in particular forced co-ownership because of the minimum plot size legislation, decreases 
efficiency.  This  is  particularly  striking  given  that  the  minimum  farm  size  legislation  was 
motivated by a desire to prevent land fragmentation because of hypothetical diseconomies of 
scale. Our results indicate, however, that co-ownership leads to an under-allocation of land to 
both households and de novo agricultural companies. These agricultural companies are often of 
similar size as the cooperatives (see table 2), and hence should have similar economies (or dis-
economies) of scale.  At the same time, their incentive structure and decision-making process is 
generally  more  conducive  to  profit-maximizing  production  and  efficient  asset  allocation, 
compared to cooperatives (Mathijs and Swinnen, 2001).   
                                                 
15 A potential reason is the organizational structure of the cooperative, where each member has one vote, which does 
not facilitate possible efficiency-enhancing employment reductions. Moreover, the management functions of the 
cooperatives are very often still occupied by the former managers of the collectives (Mathijs and Vranken, 2001).   17 
  In  addition to potential efficiency trade-offs, there are several reasons to believe that 
misallocation  of  land  to  cooperatives  and  abandonment  could  substantially  affect  household 
welfare. First, land abandonment implies that a household is not receiving any returns to that 
land asset. Second, households’ returns from renting to cooperatives might be limited because  
large farm organizations have substantial market power in local or regional land markets. Indeed, 
evidence from a number of transition countries suggest that cooperatives often offer  lower prices 
and worse contract terms than  individual farms  (Vranken and Swinnen, 2006).  For example, in 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia land rents paid by cooperative farms were only between 20% 
to 50% of the rents paid by family farms in the past years (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006).  Further, 
surveys show that cooperative farms generally paid their rents in kind, while family farms were 
much more likely to pay  cash or mixed cash/in-kind, both in Bulgaria  and in other Eastern 
European countries (World Bank, 2006).  
We hence turn to analyzing the welfare implications of land co-ownership. Following 
Finan et al. (2005) we use a principal component analysis and construct a welfare index based on 
the ownership of key assets.
16 To analyze the effect of co-ownership on welfare, we include, 
besides the total amount of land owned by the household, a separate variable indicating the 
amount of land co-owned. For land that is in co-ownership, we divide plot size by the number of 
co-owners to calculate the amount of land owned by the household. 
The first column of table 8 shows the OLS regression results, while column 2 and 3 show 
IV  results that account  for the endogeneity of  co-ownership.  In particular, in column 2 we 
instrument the co-owned area with a dummy variable that equals one if the household owns 
some land that cannot be divided according to the minimum plot size law. In column 3, we use 
the area that is in legally forced co-ownership as instrument for the total co-owned area. Column 
4 to 6 show a second set of results focusing directly on the relationship between welfare and the 
area that is rented out to a cooperative or left abandoned, which is instrumented with the same 
variables as before. We add control variables for household’s human capital (education and age 
                                                 
16 The analysis was based on ownership of a house, car, color TV, black and white TV, video, personal computer, 
telephone, and cell phone. We use the first component, which captures more than 33% of the total variance and has 
an Eigen value that is twice as high as the second, as the welfare index. The index has mean zero and a standard 
deviation of 1.63.    18 
of the household head) and regional fixed effects.
 17 These results indicate that land co-ownership 
is negatively related to household welfare, holding total land ownership and other household 
characteristics constant. Adding the coefficients of total land ownership and of the area in co-
ownership, we note that the estimated returns to land for land in co-ownership are in fact not 
significantly different from zero in the IV estimates.
18  Furthermore, the results in column 5 and 
6 suggest that one mechanism through which this works is that the household’s returns to land in 
cooperatives or left abandoned are much lower than the returns to other land. The coefficients 
obtained in the IV are very similar for the two definitions of the instrument, and are in fact very 
different from the OLS results. This indicates the importance of correcting for the endogeneity of 
land allocation. The IV results suggest that the return to land that is left in the default option 
because of forced co-ownership is not significantly different from zero. 
9.  Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the impact of land property rights imperfections on asset allocation 
and household welfare by studying co-ownership of land using micro-evidence from Bulgaria. 
While  land  titles  are  distributed  and  land  plots  clearly  defined  and  delineated,  an  important 
property  rights  problem  that  affects  land  allocation  exists  under  the  form  of  so-called  co-
ownership or joint ownership. Household’s land ownership in Bulgaria is determined by the 
restitution process from the beginning of the 1990s, and by a law on minimum plot size. The law 
implies forced co-ownership for plots that would be below the minimum size if they were to be 
divided  among  all  the  legal  co-owners.  This  paper  takes  advantage  of  the  artificial  cut-off 
resulting from the law on minimum plot size to identify the effect of co-ownership on land 
allocation decisions and household welfare. 
Using plot-level information from a recent household survey in Bulgaria, we show that 
plots that are in co-ownership are much more likely to be left abandoned or used by large-scale 
cooperatives, which are generally considered less efficient farm organizations.  Vice versa, they 
are less likely to be used by individual household farms or de novo agricultural companies. 
                                                 
17 Plot level characteristics are not included because welfare is analyzed at the household level. 
18 The estimated sum is in fact negative, but t-tests confirm that the sum is not significantly different from zero (P-
value equals 0.45 for specification in column 2 and 0.83 for column 3).   19 
Inefficient allocations are more likely for plots with a larger number of co-owners, suggesting 
larger transaction costs and decision-making problems as the number of co-owners increases. 
Our results also suggest that the negative allocation effects can be mitigated when monitoring 
and  coordination costs are low  –  e.g.  when  co-owners live  in  the same  village.  Finally, the 
analysis in this paper indicates that land co-ownership translates in substantial household welfare 
losses.  
The  evidence  in  this  paper  suggests  that  property  rights  imperfections  can  remain  a  serious 
constraint, even after a massive land privatization process aimed at restituting complete property 
rights. As such, it sheds new light on the different dimensions of property rights that can be 
important for economic growth and development. In particular, historical ownership and legal 
constraints can increase transaction costs and affect effective decision-making. This can result in 
sub-optimal land allocation, even after complete land titles have been established.    20 
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Estimations with bandwidth = 0.99. t-statistic calculated based on bootstrapped standard error with 100 replications 
 
 






























































































































) 422 . 0 ˆ = a   t=22.91   26 
Table 1: Pre-reform agricultural structures in Bulgaria, 1985 
  Share of arable land (%)  Average size (ha) 
Agro-industrial complexes 
comprising of 
80.7  12 600 
Collective farms  58.3  4 000 
State farms  8.8  2 100 
Brigades  13.6  na 
Other agricultural 
organisations 
6.2  1 215 
Private plots  13.1  0.38 
Total  100   




Table 2: Post-reform agricultural structures in Bulgaria, 1995-1999 
  1995  1999 












State farms  6.5  310.9  1.6  241.2 
Municipality farms  -  -  2.0  n.a. 
Organisations under 
liquidation 
-  -  0  0 
Co-operatives  40.8  815.3  36.8  482.5 
Household farms  52.5  1.4  56.0  2.6* 
Farming companies  0.7  283.5  3.6  378.6 
Total  100.0    100.0   
Source: NSI, 1997 & 2001 
   27 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Nr of observations 1800 1775 Significance
mean sd mean sd difference
PLOT LEVEL
Share of total sample 50 50
% Non-divisable by law 79
Number of coowners 3.4 2
   From the same village 1.9 2.2
   Not from the same village 1.5 1.1
Number of forced coowners 3.1 1.8
   From the same village 1.8 1.1
   Not from the same village 1.3 1.8
Other plot-level variables
Plot size 0.8 1.3 0.6 2.6 **
Quality (1-10) 4.8 2 5.3 2 ***
Distance 3 12 3.1 8.9
% Used by the owner 26 15 ***
% Rented out to an other household 5 2 ***
% Rented out to a cooperative 30 49 ***
% Rented out to a company 19 13 ***
% Abandoned 21 22
67 32 ***
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL mean sd
Land ownership and use
Area in co-ownership 0.5 0.9
Area owned solely by one household 1.9 2.5
Total area owned per household 2.4 2.4
Number of plots owned per household 5.6 5.4
Area in owner-cultivation 0.4 1.2
% households that cultivated land 61.6
Area cultivated by the household 1 3.8
Number of plots cultivated per household 1.5 2.1
% households that bought land 2.8
   For those who bought land: Area bought (ha) 2.1 2.8
   For those who bought land: Number of plots bought 1.5 0.8
Other household characteristics
Age household head 64.8 12
Years of education household head 8.9 3.1
% households that immigrated 9
 Of which: % land cultivating 49
% household that emigrated 4
% of households with some land:
used by the owner 44.5
rented out to an other household 9
rented out to a cooperative 48.6
rented out to a company 28.8
abandoned 43.7
Plot allocation
Non co-owned plots Co-owned plots
Plot-level data on co-ownership
% plots over which the owner declares to have effective 
decision power  28 
Table 4: Plot allocation decision: multinomial regression with owner-cultivation 
  Specification 1  Specification 2  Specification 3 

















Non-divisible by law  -0.353  0.947***  0.399  1.054***                 
  (0.763)  (4.241)  (1.016)  (4.322)                 
# forced co-owners          -0.235  0.418***  0.200*  0.377***  -0.235  0.418***  0.200  0.377*** 
          (1.060)  (5.968)  (1.680)  (4.649)  (0.742)  (4.477)  (0.737)  (3.232) 
Land owned (ha)  -0.007  0.001  0.001  0.002***  -0.006  0.001  0.001  0.002***  -0.006*  0.001  0.001  0.002*** 
  (0.922)  (1.381)  (1.204)  (2.627)  (0.882)  (1.447)  (1.235)  (2.988)  (1.826)  (1.240)  (1.123)  (3.458) 
Age hh head  0.120  -0.011  -0.061  -0.213**  0.125  0.062  -0.032  -0.156**  0.125  0.062  -0.032  -0.156*** 
  (0.708)  (0.156)  (0.395)  (2.564)  (0.719)  (0.848)  (0.200)  (2.122)  (0.652)  (0.871)  (0.210)  (2.990) 
(Age hh head)^
2  -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.002***  -0.001  -0.000  0.001  0.002***  -0.001  -0.000  0.001  0.002*** 
  (0.551)  (0.607)  (0.687)  (3.094)  (0.564)  (0.331)  (0.480)  (2.747)  (0.546)  (0.325)  (0.544)  (3.999) 
Education hh head  -0.625**  -0.011  0.169  0.080  -0.615**  -0.010  0.180  0.081  -0.615***  -0.010  0.180  0.081 
  (2.567)  (0.056)  (0.622)  (0.368)  (2.566)  (0.053)  (0.677)  (0.391)  (3.445)  (0.059)  (1.289)  (0.425) 
Education hh head^
2  0.034***  -0.000  -0.002  -0.001  0.034***  -0.000  -0.003  -0.001  0.034***  -0.000  -0.003  -0.001 
  (2.762)  (0.015)  (0.160)  (0.098)  (2.758)  (0.031)  (0.200)  (0.144)  (3.421)  (0.034)  (0.311)  (0.138) 
region==NE  0.839*  0.381  -0.061  -2.801***  0.868*  0.409  -0.045  -2.862***  0.868  0.409  -0.045  -2.862*** 
  (1.662)  (1.111)  (0.179)  (4.951)  (1.724)  (1.181)  (0.134)  (5.085)  (1.496)  (0.383)  (0.053)  (3.127) 
region==SC  -0.310  -0.013  -2.649***  -0.475**  -0.292  -0.009  -2.645***  -0.459**  -0.292  -0.009  -2.645***  -0.459 
  (0.775)  (0.054)  (8.185)  (2.351)  (0.724)  (0.037)  (8.115)  (2.304)  (0.371)  (0.009)  (2.830)  (1.390) 
Constant  -3.556  -0.445  -0.122  3.931  -3.802  -2.751  -1.071  2.239  -3.802  -2.751  -1.071  2.239 
  (0.670)  (0.200)  (0.023)  (1.451)  (0.695)  (1.158)  (0.193)  (0.907)  (0.619)  (1.418)  (0.207)  (1.425) 
Clustering on 
household 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Clustering on 
community 
No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Community fixed 
effect 
No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Observations  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575 
Regression results account for sampling weights.  
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
   29 
Table 4: Multinomial regression results (continued) 
  Specification 4  Specification 5  Specification 6 



















# forced co-owners  0.013  0.201***  0.081  0.298***  0.039  0.206***  0.079  0.237***         
  (0.100)  (3.484)  (1.020)  (3.748)  (0.302)  (3.278)  (0.949)  (3.191)         
  From the same village                   -0.066  0.076  0.418*  0.194 
                  (0.222)  (0.549)  (1.736)  (1.340) 
  Not from the same village                  0.044  0.229***  -0.085  0.320*** 
                  (0.249)  (3.144)  (0.562)  (3.345) 
Plot quality (1-10)          -0.055  -0.001  -0.212**  0.609***         
          (0.412)  (0.022)  (2.225)  (7.692)         
Distance to plot (km)          0.139***  0.143***  0.115***  0.163***         
          (3.277)  (3.921)  (2.594)  (4.491)         
Plotsize (ha)          0.014*  -0.002  -0.002  -0.087***         
          (1.739)  (0.883)  (0.979)  (3.732)         
Land owned (ha)  -0.008  0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.014*  0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.008  0.001  0.001  0.001* 
  (0.819)  (0.718)  (1.525)  (1.642)  (1.722)  (0.739)  (1.575)  (1.585)  (0.819)  (0.888)  (1.112)  (1.803) 
Age hh head  0.074  0.043  -0.356*  -0.169**  0.054  0.035  -0.346*  -0.182**  0.074  0.046  -0.371*  -0.164** 
  (0.433)  (0.588)  (1.899)  (2.238)  (0.351)  (0.472)  (1.915)  (2.300)  (0.437)  (0.636)  (1.887)  (2.149) 
(Age hh head)^
2  -0.000  -0.000  0.003**  0.002***  0.000  0.000  0.003**  0.002***  -0.000  -0.000  0.003**  0.002*** 
  (0.060)  (0.137)  (2.132)  (2.693)  (0.074)  (0.020)  (2.132)  (2.749)  (0.061)  (0.172)  (2.105)  (2.617) 
Education hh head  -0.861***  -0.057  0.244  0.145  -0.854***  -0.015  0.226  0.099  -0.861***  -0.055  0.233  0.147 
  (2.777)  (0.274)  (0.883)  (0.697)  (2.810)  (0.069)  (0.783)  (0.486)  (2.759)  (0.265)  (0.866)  (0.710) 
(Education hh head)^
2  0.049***  0.002  -0.007  -0.005  0.049***  -0.000  -0.006  -0.002  0.049***  0.001  -0.006  -0.005 
  (3.361)  (0.156)  (0.495)  (0.480)  (3.477)  (0.043)  (0.436)  (0.159)  (3.341)  (0.146)  (0.466)  (0.496) 
Clustering on household  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustering on community  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
Community fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575  3575 
Regression results account for sampling weights.  
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
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Table 5: Plot allocation decision: logit regression of the probability of renting to cooperatives or leaving plot abandoned 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Number of forced co-owners  0.369***  0.237***  0.379***  0.212*** 
  (6.409)  (7.330)  (6.393)  (6.687) 
Plot quality (1-10)      0.391***  0.362*** 
      (7.372)  (10.824) 
Distance to plot (km)      0.218***  0.079*** 
      (5.304)  (3.282) 
Plotsize (decares)      -0.005***  -0.004*** 
      (2.815)  (2.671) 
Household fixed effects  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Observations  2198  2198  2198  2198 
Regression results account for sampling weights. 
Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Plot allocation decision: linear probability of renting to cooperatives or leaving plot abandoned 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
Number forced co-owners  0.056    0.054   
  (7.22)***    (6.96)***   
Number co-owners IV    0.063    0.061 
    (7.17)***    (6.95)*** 
Plot quality (1-10)      0.056  0.056 
      (7.30)***  (7.32)*** 
Distance to plot (km)      0.008  0.008 
      (3.47)***  (3.48)*** 
Plotsize (decares)      -0.001  -0.001 
      (-1.79)*  (-2.43)** 
Household fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
R²  0.2872    0.2449   
Observations  2198  2198  2198  2198 
       
First Stage Regression Dependent variable  Number co-owners    Number co-owners 
Number forced co-owners   0.889    0.894 
    (60.00)***    (62.70)*** 
Plot quality (1-10)        -0.004 
        (-1.15) 
Distance to plot (km)        0.005 
        (2.21)** 
Plotsize (decares)        0.003 
        (4.11)*** 
Household fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
R²    0.9707    0.9724 
Observations    2198    2198 
Regression results account for sampling weights  
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.     32 
Table 7: Plot allocation: linear probability of renting to cooperatives or leaving plot abandoned by region 
 
  North-Central    North-East    South-Central   
  OLS  IV    OLS  IV    OLS  IV   
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)   
Number forced co-owners  0.041*    0.081    0.056***   
  (1.83)    (0.48)    (6.81)   
Number co-owners    0.057*    0.080    0.061*** 
    (1.86)    (0.48)    (6.78) 
Plot quality (1-10)  0.098***  0.098***  0.095  0.128  0.045***  0.045*** 
  (10.59)  (10.57)  (0.48)  (0.57)  (4.89)  (4.89) 
Distance to plot (km)  0.040***  0.040***  0.001  0.001  0.016***  0.015*** 
  (4.93)  (5.04)  (0.59)  (0.40)  (4.05)  (3.90) 
Plotsize (decares)  0.002  -0.000  0.003  0.002  -0.001**  -0.001*** 
  (0.62)  (0.15)  (0.96)  (0.43)  (2.26)  (2.85) 
Household fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  745  745  74  74  1379  1379 
R²  0.45  0.45  0.18  0.15  0.31  0.31 
       
First Stage Regression Dependent variable  Number co-owners  Number co-owners  Number co-owners 
Number forced co-owners   0.716***  1.012***  0.917*** 
  (19.40)  (20.23)  (61.42) 
Plot quality (1-10)  0.003  -0.409  -0.000 
  (0.48)  (0.80)  (0.12) 
Distance to plot (km)  -0.005  0.004  0.011*** 
  (0.92)  (0.71)  (5.54) 
Plotsize (decares)  0.046***  0.016*  0.002*** 
  (9.54)  (1.85)  (7.33) 
Household fixed effect  0.996**  1.079  0.228*** 
Observations  745  74  1379 
R²  0.95  0.78  0.98 
Regression results account for sampling weights  
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.     33 
 
Table 8: OLS and IV regressions of household welfare
#
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Total land ownership° 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.061*** 0.056***
(4.69) (6.29) (6.12) (5.66) (3.12) (3.29)
Area in co-ownership° -0.012 -0.030** -0.022*
(1.24) (2.28) (1.88)
Area rented to cooperative or abandoned° -0.010 -0.112* -0.099*
(1.11) (1.88) (1.98)
Age household head -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.032** -0.035***
(4.86) (5.75) (5.68) (6.06) (2.47) (3.09)
Education household head 0.077** 0.061* 0.063** 0.065** 0.041 0.044
(2.41) (2.08) (2.17) (2.29) (1.30) (1.39)
Regional fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
0.44 0.83
0.24 0.23
Observations 697 697 697 697 697 697
R-squared 0.22 0.24
First stage regression dependent variable area in coownership
Total land ownership° 0.065*** 0.043** 0.388*** 0.381***
(3.33) (2.43) (4.91) (4.89)
Owns plot that cannot be divided by law 14.175*** 3.766**
(13.56) (2.44)
Area in forced co-ownership° 1.425*** 0.310**
(21.47) (2.58)
Age household head 0.016 -0.023 0.164** 0.157**
(0.67) (1.23) (2.26) (2.16)
Education household head -0.102 -0.128 -0.204 -0.216
(1.10) (1.51) (0.76) (0.81)
Regional fixed effects yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.49 0.51 0.30 0.30
# Dependent variable: welfare index based on ownerhsip of key assets (first principal component).
°Area expressed in decares. 10 decares = 1 hectare
Regression results account for sampling weights.  Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the community level 
Robust t statistics in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
P-value of testing H0: total land ownership+ area in co-
ownership=0
P-value of testing H0: total land ownership + area 
rented to cooperative or abandoned=0
area rented to coop. or abandoned